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Prologue: An Unorthodox Orientation to Salvation
Before I address the question of the apostrophe to the reader in Paradiso 2, it may 
prove helpful to give some orientation to my approach by briefly discussing the 
relationship between Paradiso 19’s and 20’s responses to the problem of reconciling 
divine justice with the orthodox Catholic creed “extra Ecclesiam nulla salus” [no 
salvation outside the Church].1 In Paradiso 19, the Eagle of Divine Justice asks 
the pilgrim’s question for him:
“ché tu dicevi ‘Un uom nasce a la riva
de l’Indo, e quivi non è chi ragioni
di Cristo né chi legga né chi scriva,
e tutti suoi voleri e atti buoni
sono, quanto ragione umana vede,
sanza peccato in vita o in sermoni.
Muore non battezzato e sanza fede:
ov’ è questa giustizia che ’l condanna?
ov’ è la colpa sua se ei non crede?’”2
[“for you would say: ‘A man is born on the banks of the Indus, and no 
one is there to speak of Christ or read or write of him, and all his desires 
and acts are good, as far as human reason can see, without sin in life or in 
word. He dies unbaptized and without our faith: where is this justice that 
condemns him? where is his fault if he does not believe?’”]
The Eagle’s initial and direct response to this question affirms (in a subjunctive 
and counterfactual conditional):
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“Certo a colui che meco s’assottiglia,
se la Scrittura sovra voi non fosse,
da dubitar sarebbe a maraviglia.” (Paradiso 19, lines 82–84)
[“Certainly for the one who matches wits with me, if the Scriptures were 
not over you, there would be wondrous cause for doubt.”]
Nevertheless, the Eagle goes on to insist:
“A questo regno
non salì mai chi non credette ’n Cristo,
né pria né poi ch’ el si chiavasse al legno.” (Paradiso 19, lines 103–5)
[“To this kingdom no one has ever risen who did not believe in Christ, 
either before or after he was nailed to the wood.”]
These passages pose an interpretive dilemma for us concerning the ways in 
which they might be read as a response to the doctrine of extra Ecclesiam nulla 
salus. The two options seem to be as follows: either (a) the Eagle is suggesting 
that the temporal institution of the Church provides the only efficacious means of 
stimulating human striving for salvation, or (b) the Eagle’s comment requires us to 
understand Ecclesia as something other than the temporal institution of the Church.
The reasons by which we are forced to reject the first of these two interpretive 
possibilities are obvious. In the first place, I can think of no work of Dante’s that 
any serious reader (let alone Dante himself) has ever cast as claiming or as illustrat-
ing the claim that the efficacy of the Church as a political institution legitimizes 
either its function in the political arena or its role in the spiritual development of 
its flock. Quite to the contrary, nobody seriously doubts the sincerity of the Divine 
Comedy’s many explicit criticisms (most pointed, perhaps, in Purgatorio 16) of 
the temporal Church for the harm it does to human strivings when it debases itself 
by being too involved in mundane matters. But beyond these general reasons to 
reject the first interpretive possibility, in the very next canto, the pilgrim discovers 
that two of the souls that compose parts of the Eagle’s eyebrow are the Roman 
emperor Trajan, who, through a miracle, was resurrected after his death so that 
he could convert to Christianity, and the Trojan warrior Ripheus, who is known 
to us only because of the briefest of mentions in Virgil’s Aeneid. In short, Dante’s 
positioning of these souls—along with Cato’s puzzling appearance as the first soul 
encountered in Purgatorio—forces us to accept the conclusion that, in the Divine 
Comedy, participation in the Church as a political and therefore also as a historical 
institution is in no way necessary for salvation.
But what, then, are we to make of the other interpretive option? It is one 
thing to say that Dante’s Eagle poses a challenge for us in how we understand the 
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salvific significance of human participation in the Church, but it is quite another 
to try to pinpoint what it is that we are supposed to derive from this provocation. 
Orthodox Catholic doctrine certainly allows the possibility of salvation through 
implicit baptism (especially in the case of pre-Christian pagans), some kinds of 
sacrificial acts (e.g., baptism through blood), and other means as well. But it is facile 
simply to insist that Cato, Ripheus, and Trajan are saved by an implicit faith while 
Virgil, Aristotle, and Saladin are damned for its absence. Or, in other words, the 
interpretive claim that Cato, Ripheus, and Trajan are saved by their implicit faith 
cannot be justified simply by rejecting the other horn of the interpretive dilemma 
posed above. Rather, justifying this second interpretive approach also requires an 
account of what faith means within the framework of the Divine Comedy.
In this brief essay, it is not my intention to offer a direct account of the way 
in which the Divine Comedy compels us to understand the salvific significance of 
faith. Nevertheless, I would like to hypothesize that what we may be able to see 
in Paradiso 19 and 20 is that when the Divine Comedy entertains the doctrine of 
extra Ecclesiam nulla salus, it stresses the notion that possessing knowledge or 
correct beliefs about the reality of particular objects of cognition is neither a neces-
sary nor a sufficient condition for salvation. Rather, in the Divine Comedy, salus 
is made possible only by a peculiar kind of orientation to salus itself. In a Kantian 
idiom, I would put it this way: reconciling Paradiso 19 and 20 would require the 
recognition that the narrative and dramatic logic of the Divine Comedy is bound by 
the recognition that the condition for the possibility of salus is only that a human 
being be capable of representing to oneself the reality of salus and that, in the act 
of representing salus as an end, she also orients herself toward it as the goal of her 
practical activities.
I think this interpretation can be directly defended, particularly by attending 
to discussions in the Convivio and Monarchia concerning the proper aims and 
relationships between Church and empire and the ways in which Dante claims 
these institutions are independently responsible for orienting human beings to two 
distinct beatitudes that govern and order all human action. In fact, I have discussed 
these matters in other contexts,3 so I will excuse myself from this task in the context 
of this essay. Nevertheless, I hope that this brief orientation will turn out to have 
provided a useful framework within which to consider my discussion of the address 
to the reader in Paradiso 2.
The Construction of the Audience
One last caveat is in order. Before proceeding with my discussion of the Divine 
Comedy’s address to its readers, I would ask that my own readers imagine them-
selves as having already witnessed Dante’s passage through Hell and Purgatory 
so that they are now, at this moment, by virtue of that prior experience, prepared 
to give consideration to the opening of Paradiso 2. The advantage of my request 
should be obvious: the address in Paradiso 2 presupposes that everyone who reads 
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it has, in common with every other reader, the shared history of having read the 
prior two cantiche of the Divine Comedy itself. I should hasten to add that I do 
not believe that the address assumes anything more than this about whether the 
reader should also have read La vita nuova or Convivio or the Tenzone, nor even 
that its readers might be familiar with its allusion to Ovid’s Metamorphoses 7, 
lines 100–158.4 Of course, there have always been debates about the significance 
of palinodes and biblical and literary allusions in the Divine Comedy, but I do not 
think it is terribly important that we give much consideration to these questions 
at this juncture. The important thing to note is that, whatever else in our personal 
histories distinguishes us as individual readers of the address, the address assumes 
that we have in common the shared experience of a pilgrimage that takes place 
through having already witnessed Dante’s representations of Hell and Purgatory. 
It is tempting, in fact, to go so far as to say that the address calls our attention to 
our shared historical preparation for receiving and being transformed by the Divine 
Comedy’s ministry to us.
To show how this might be the case, I will now turn to the address itself.5 The 
address to the reader at the beginning of Paradiso 2 is one of the Divine Comedy’s 
more overt insofar as it presents a formal apostrophe, and, at eighteen lines, it is 
also the longest of the poem’s addresses to the reader. But it is also unique in that 
it seems to address two distinct sets of readers. First there is an address to readers, 
who are cautioned to turn back:
O voi6 che siete in piccioletta barca,
desiderosi d’ascoltar, seguiti
dietro al mio legno, che cantando varca:
tornate a riveder li vostri liti,
non vi mettete in pelago, ché forse,
perdendo me, rimarreste smarriti;
l’acqua ch’ io prendo già mai non si corse;
Minerva spira, e conducemi Appollo,
e nove Muse mi dimostran l’Orse. (Paradiso 2, lines 1–9)
[O you who in little barks, desirous of listening, have followed after my 
ship that sails onward singing: turn back to see your shores again, do not 
put out on the deep sea, for perhaps, losing me, you would be lost; the 
waters that I enter have never before been crossed; Minerva inspires and 
Apollo leads me, and nine Muses point out to me the Bears.]
This is followed by an address to
Voi altri pochi, che drizzaste il collo
per tempo al pan de li angeli,7 del quale
5The Divine Comedy’s Construction of Its Audience
vivesi qui ma non sen vien satollo:
metter potete ben per l’alto sale
vostro navigio, servando mio solco
dinanzi a l’acqua che ritorna equale;
que’ glorïosi che passaro al Colco
non s’ammiraron come voi farete,
quando Iasón vider fatto bifolco. (Paradiso 2, lines 10–18)
[You other few, who stretched out your necks early on for the bread of 
angels, which one lives on here though never sated by it: you can well set 
your course over the salt deep, staying within my wake before the water 
returns level again; those glorious ones who sailed to Colchos did not so 
marvel as you will do, when they saw Jason become a plowman.]
This brings me to the title of this essay. On first blush, it appears that these 
eighteen lines of Paradiso 2 address two distinct audiences. And yet, insofar as the 
address offers all of its readers the opportunity to make the choice of whether they 
are among the altri pochi or not, it also seems to construct its audience as a single 
readership—a readership that, at this moment, neither more nor less than anywhere 
else in the Divine Comedy, is, in a certain sense, being compelled to choose a way 
to find meaning (existentially speaking) in the act of reading the Divine Comedy. 
Both are plausible interpretations: these lines either address two audiences or 
impose a choice on every reader such that there is only one audience. Despite the 
title of this essay, neither of these possibilities can be correct. Both possibilities 
must be wrong because the address presupposes something else, even if we read it 
as compelling every reader to choose how she or he is being addressed. Namely, 
while the address can be read as constructing either a single audience or two differ-
ent audiences, it presupposes that all of its readers will have in common not only 
the hermeneutical framework of the two prior cantiche of the Divine Comedy but 
also the experience of being faced with an interpretive choice in light of both that 
common prior experience and whatever else in their personal histories differenti-
ates them from one another as individual readers.
Hence, even if the prior cantiche serve as the finite history that in large part 
provides a determinate hermeneutical framework within which the address itself 
must be interpreted, it is also nevertheless clear that the address comments on the 
fact that neither the prior cantiche nor even the address itself fully determines the 
possible meanings that readers will glean from the address. In fact, despite all the 
trouble he has gone to in the prior two cantiche to establish his auctoritas as being 
worthy of our faith in him as our guide, Dante seems, at the outset of the Paradiso, 
to have abandoned the carefully controlled dialectic between author and reader in 
order to insist on the authoritative independence of his readers.8 According to the 
logic of this particular address, the most faithful reading of the Divine Comedy is 
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irreducibly personal, and the most faithful reader is also the most independent and 
least in need of guidance in how to read.
As evidence for this claim, notice the order in which we are addressed—first 
there is a warning to those of us who sit in our little barks (“voi che siete . . .”). But 
we have not found out yet that there are any others who are about to be addressed. 
And, especially in light of the structure of the Divine Comedy’s prior apostrophes, 
there is not even a hint in the first nine lines that the voi che of the first line does 
not apply to every single reader of the Divine Comedy. So, insofar as we all come 
to these lines together, were we prepared to obey Dante’s order, we should simply 
stop at the end of line 9, never to find out that there are any other kinds of readers, 
for whom the rest of the Paradiso is intended.
So what does this tell us about the privileged reader of the Divine Comedy, 
the reader who early on stretched out her or his neck for the bread of angels? 
Does it not suggest that such a reader is not merely independent, one for whom 
the meaning of the Divine Comedy is not taken to stand independently of her 
own activity of reading it, but also intrepid, perhaps a reader who is more than a 
bit willing to transgress clearly marked boundaries, even at the risk of her own 
personal annihilation?
To complicate matters further, are we not also entitled to insist that Dante’s 
strategy requires a ruse; for who among us, whether or not one is willing to risk 
her own personal annihilation, could imagine that she or he is among the many 
poor readers for whom there might in fact be any such risk in carrying forward 
in the Paradiso? Does not the offer of this choice conceal behind a veil the truth 
that all—or at least most—of the readers of the address will insist either that they 
have been craving the bread of angels all along (even before they began reading 
Inferno) or that, even if they are not consciously interested in such sustenance, at 
least they are not convinced that any harm will come to them by continuing onward? 
This acknowledgment of the possibility that the address conceals something from 
the view of at least some of the readers whom it purports to address compels us 
to allow that there are at least three possible audiences for the address: those few 
(rather than many) who are competent but not intrepid, those other few who are 
both competent and intrepid, and the many who are intrepid but are unaware of 
their incompetence.
But what would it mean to say that the majority of those who do not turn back 
might drown? This is not a silly question, especially if we accept the conclusion 
that the number of readers who are either intrepid and competent enough to be 
saved or competent and pious enough to turn back will actually be a minority of 
readers. If Dante is suggesting that the majority of his readers might end up harmed 
by reading the Paradiso, we certainly ought to ask what this means. How could 
harm come to any of us—the competent and incompetent alike? What is it about 
the Paradiso that could possibly harm poor readers? What could turn poor read-
ers—readers so poor that they do not even take good advice when it is offered—into 
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even worse people—lost people, drowned people? What is the source of the risk 
that at least some of the readers of the Divine Comedy, rather than being saved by 
their own craving for a meaning “del quale vivesi qui ma non sen vien satollo,” 
might be seduced either by the magnanimo who is leading them on their voyage 
or, like Ulysses, by their own hubris? And, crucially, where is the qui in which one 
lives without satiation by craving this meaning? Does the qui locate some kind of 
otherworldly reality that is the supposed referent for Dante’s Paradiso, or is the qui 
a metaphor for some kind of human activity that might be made possible through 
the utterly temporal activity of interpreting Dante’s Paradiso? In either case, how 
can orienting oneself toward such a place or condition pose a risk that one might 
fall instead into a condition that is very much its opposite?
It is not my intention in this brief essay to offer direct responses to these 
questions. My more modest aim here is simply to pose these questions in such a 
way that they establish a space in which to offer the observation that everything 
about this peculiar address to the reader seems to turn piety on its head such that 
what we would normally call the pious reader, the charitable reader, the reader who 
is giving the text its due, is the wrong sort of reader altogether. The right kind of 
reader is the reader who resists the seduction of this text, who resists the illusion 
of a harmonious whole, who relishes the text’s carefully crafted ambiguities more 
than its consistencies. But it is not enough simply to be independent; one must 
also somehow be competent, and other than the vexing metaphor that associates 
competence with having, early on, stretched out one’s neck for the bread of angels, 
we have not received a great number of clues from this address about what that 
kind of competence might require. Suffice it for now to say that the address does 
suggest that there is a crucial difference between the sort of reader who has already 
been prepared for a comprehension that might be stimulated and encouraged by 
interpreting the Divine Comedy and the sort of reader who absolves herself or 
himself of the responsibility for this interpretive activity. That distinction, though, 
is not to be found by identifying and assessing the consciously avowed beliefs of 
these readers about the supposed allegorical referents of the poem—which is to 
say that it is not the beliefs themselves that produce an orientation to salus; rather, 
the distinction between two kinds of readers has everything to do with the ways in 
which human beings might orient themselves both through and against the grain of 
their personal beliefs in what might be called a sacramental relationship to the text.
But, in closing, I would also like to link these questions back to the frame-
work I provided at the outset of this essay. I would like to think I have lent some 
credibility to my unorthodox reading of Dante’s treatment of the meaning of faith 
and its relationship to the possibility of personal salvation in the context of the 
Divine Comedy’s focus on the doctrine of extra Ecclesiam nulla salus. For if I am 
at all right about the kinds of interpretive demands that the address to the reader in 
Paradiso 2 makes on its readers, then I think I might also be right in insisting that 
the Divine Comedy is not the poetic illustration of a summa theologiae—that is, 
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that the Divine Comedy is not an allegory of theology in the way in which either 
allegory or theology are generally understood. It is better read as an anti-summa, as 
a challenge to the notion that the aims of theology (or philosophy) can be completed 
in any orthodoxical or scientific project, whether dependent on natural reason alone 
or supplemented by God’s revelation of his incarnation in and through the history 
of the world. Or if the Divine Comedy is an allegorical summa of sorts, then it 
is a summa that reminds us of the necessity for further supplementation beyond 
knowledge or revelation in its ordinary sense. Rather, as we have seen, “faith” 
in the Divine Comedy marks out a relationship of oneself to oneself that cannot 
be resolved or completed in any kind of knowledge, conviction, belief, and the 
like—it is a faith that creates a truth rather than one that presupposes a truth that is 
independent of our realization of it. In other words, for the faithful readers of the 
Divine Comedy, the faith that secures salvation is instead an always incomplete 
activity of orienting ourselves together in the shared but eminently practical (and 
therefore historically and politically situated) activity of interpreting the Divine 
Comedy. Or if such a reading could be completed, then, at most, its comple-
tion might occur when an individual reader’s practical activity of judgment and 
discernment, in the finitude of the moment, is oriented to some good that can be 
accomplished then and only then as the only possible decision available to a free 
and self-reflective human being. This, in short, is what I think the address to the 
reader in Paradiso 2 calls on its audience to recognize. Those who are not able to 
entertain this unorthodox possibility ought indeed turn back and prepare themselves 
once again for this realization.
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